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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
ROBERT BERRETT, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD,
Defendant/Petitioner.

)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.
Court of Appeals No.
910215-CA
Priority No. 16

)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Petitioner, The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad,
requests the Supreme Court to exercise its power of supervision
to review two issues:
1.

Is a trial court's discretion in making a case

management decision to exclude evidence limited to cases of
"possible contempt" under Utah R.Civ.P. 26 and 37, as the Court
of Appeals held, rather than governed by the broader standards of
Utah R.Civ.P. 16 and the trial courts' inherent powers?
2.

Where there is no proffer of evidence excluded by

a trial court case management ruling, is the burden on the
objecting party, as the Court of Appeals' decision requires,
(rather t}ian on the proponent of the evidence) to establish what
effect the evidence may have had on the result at trial?

-1g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals (the
"Opinion") issued on April 3, 1992.
Adv. Rep. 49 (4/21/92).

It was published at 184 Utah

A copy is attached as Appendix 1.
JURISDICTION

A.

On April 3, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals

decision was filed.
B.

No orders concerning a rehearing or extensions of

time within which to petition for certiorari have been requested
or made.
C.

Petitioner believes the respondents do not intend

to file a cross-petition.
D.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1992).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a
scheduling or pretrial order, if no appearance is made
on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial
conference, if a party or a party's attorney is
substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails
to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or
its own initiative, may make such orders with regard
thereto as are just, and among others, any of the
orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu
of or in addition to any other sanctions, the court
shall require the party or the attorney representing
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred
because of any noncompliance with this rule, including
attorney fees, unless the court finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

-2». \ «r^1 \ 1 R8\ OOOOlddl. W51

Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence:
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.

-3g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this action, the plaintiffs/respondents, landowners
of the former town of Thistle, Utah (the "Landowners"), alleged
that petitioner The Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad (the
"Railroad"), through activities on its right-of-way at the base
of an ancient landslide, caused that landslide to become
activated, to move across the canyon below the Landowners'
property and to cause flood damage to the Landowners.
Amended Complaint, R. 872). l

(Third

Following trial from August 14 to

29, 1989,2 the jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the
Railroad and the Landowners appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(R. 1387, 1514.)

By a 2 to 1 decision, the Court of

Appeals reversed the result, finding that the trial court abused
its discretion and committed prejudicial error in excluding
testimony from an expert witness first identified by the
Landowners fourteen days before trial.

(Op. 9.)3 The Court of

Appeals remanded the action for a new trial.

(Op. 12.)

ln

R.^ refers to the Record on Appeal. "Op." refers to the
Court of appeals' opinion. Page references immediately follow.
2

The Landowners filed this action in March 1986. Initially,
trial was set for August 10, 1987; later this date was continued to
February 21, 1989 and finally to August 14, 1989. (Op. 2.)
3

Judge Jackson's dissent, while expressing doubt whether the
trial court had abused its discretion, stated that judgment should
be affirmed because the Landowners failed to establish prejudicial
error through a proffer of the expert's testimony. Judge Jackson
rejected the majority's assertion that the Railroad had the burden
to show the absence of prejudice. (Op. 13-15.)
-4-

1.

Introduction.

The Court of Appeals reversed the

result of a two-week trial, not because of any error at trial,
but because of the pretrial exclusion of a late-named expert
witness whose testimony is unknown to this day.

In so reversing,

the court erroneously (a) characterized the trial court's case
management decision as a "discovery ruling," and (b) relieved the
Landowner? of any obligation to proffer the excluded testimony.
This decision so departs from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings that this Court should exercise its power of
supervision to reinstate the jury's verdict and affirm the trial
court's Judgment.
2.

Utah R.App.P. 46(c).

Failure to Disclose Final Witness List.

A June 23,

1989, letter to the Landowners from the Railroad recounted the
Railroad's difficulties in obtaining a "final" witness list.
748 [Appendix 2 hereto].)

(R.

At a June 27, 1989, pretrial hearing

to discuss final preparation for the August 14, 1989, trial, the
Railroad advised the trial court that, while it had received on
the previous Friday a list of twenty-five new witnesses proposed
by the Landowners (in addition to thirty-two witnesses previously
identified),4 the Landowners had failed to provide the Railroad
with their final witness list.
pp. 6-8.)3

(Appendix 2 and R. 1543,

The Railroad requested that the Landowners be

4

See draft pretrial order, attached to Appellants' Brief as
Appendix B.
5

R. 1543 is the transcript of the June 27, 1989, hearing and
is provided at Appendix 3.
-5g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

required to provide "a clear statement of who [they were] really
going to call as witnesses so [the Railroad could] take whatever
additional discovery might be appropriate. . . . "

(Appendix 3,

p. 8.)
The trial court inquired about disclosure of a final
witness list.

(Appendix 3, pp. 28-29.) When the Landowners'

counsel announced that he needed forty days to contact the
witnesses disclosed the previous Friday, the trial court
responded: "You've got to talk to them a lot sooner than that,
Mr. Young.

I say, you'd better find out and talk to them within

the next ten or fifteen days."

(Appendix 3, p. 28.)

The trial

court then denied the Landowners' motion to continue of the
trial.

(Appendix 3, p. 28.)

Finally, the trial court warned all

counsel that each was "entitled to know who it is you are
legitimately going to call.
surprises."

[S]o that you don't end up in

(Appendix 3, p. 28.) Absent timely disclosure, "the

only thing [the court] can do is to make an order they cannot be
permitted to testify."

(Appendix 3, pp. 28-29.)

To accomplish

this disclosure, the trial court directed the parties to agree on
a form of pretrial order (which would contain a list of proposed
witnesses) within ten days.

(Appendix 3, pp. 25-26.)

July 7,

1989, the ten-day deadline set by the trial court, came and went
without the filing of such an order.
3.

(Op. 2.)

The Landowners' Witness List.

On July 12, 1989,

still facing a potential fifty-seven witnesses, the Railroad
again sent a letter (the "July 12 Letter") to the Landowners
-6-

requesting a "final" witness list.
B.)

(Appellants' Brief, Appendix

The July 12 Letter asked for disclosure by August 1, 1989.

Not until six days later, on July 19 or 20, 1989, did the
Landowners finally commence an effort to locate (among other
people) Dr. Shroder, a geologist who in 1967 had written about
the Thistle slide.

(R. 1551, p. 18.)6

Then, on August 1, 1989, two weeks before trial, the
Landowner? telecopied to the Railroad yet another witness list
identifying seventy-eight new witnesses—five (including
Dr. Shroder) to appear by live testimony and seventy-three to
appear by deposition.

(R. 1010.)7

The Railroad immediately

filed a motion to strike each of the new witnesses*

(Op. p. 3;

R. 1010 ajid 1013 [Appendix 5].)
4.

The August 3, 1989, Hearing and Exclusion Ruling.

At the August 3, 1989, hearing on the Railroad's motion to
strike, counsel for the Landowners acknowledged the following:
a.

The Landowners had access to the papers of Dr. Shroder
and had known his name "for a long time." (Appendix 4,
pp. 28-29.)

b.

Having devoted his time and efforts to another case and
having delegated trial preparation to another attorney,
counsel for the Landowners "went to work on this case"
only in July "because I was not ready. . . . "
(Appendix 4, p. 13; Appendix 3, pp. 9, 15.)

6

R. 1551 is the transcript of the crucial August 3, 1989,
hearing, a copy of which is attached as Appendix 4.
7

Tt>is brought the total number of witnesses that the
Landowners had identified to 135—with 103 being named in the last
six weeks before a scheduled two-week jury trial. (Appendix 3, pp.
24-25.)
-7g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

c.

Counsel had only commenced his efforts to contact Dr.
Shroder around "July 19th or 20th." (Appendix 4, p.
18.)

d.

Dr. Shroder, in response to counsel's late July
inquiries, had "made some preliminary conclusions,"
which counsel declined to disclose as being "work
product," but represented to be "very beneficial" and
"very helpful" to the Landowners' position. (Appendix
4, p. 19.)

e.

"I don't honestly know the bottom line of all of [Dr.
Shroder's] testimony. * * * [I]f his conclusions are
reinforced . . . by the depositions and things I've now
sent him, then I would definitely want to call him as a
witness." (Appendix 4, pp. 29 and 19.)

f.

The August 1, 1989, list was still a "possiblfe] list"
and not final. (Appendix 4, pp. 13 and 22.)
At the close of the August 3 hearing the trial court

noted that, on June 27, it had "made an order, directed from the
bench," requiring submission of a pretrial order with the
expected witness list within ten days of that date.
p. 23.)

(Appendix 4,

Consistent with that "order," the trial court ruled that

(a) persons not disclosed as witnesses by July 11, 1989,8 could
not be called as witnesses, and (b) the deposition witnesses
could be called provided all portions of deposition testimony to
be used at trial were designated no later than August 9, 1989.
(Appendix 4, pp. 23-26.)

The trial court invited the Landowners

to make tjieir record, but stated his view that the case could not

8

The written order subsequently entered lists July 7 (not
11)—ten days after the June 27 hearing. (R. 1210-11; attached as
Appendix 6.) Ultimately, after hearing the Landowners' explanation
of each proposed witness, the trial court allowed the naming of all
but two. (Appendix 4, pp. 15-20.)
-8~ . w ~ o \ ifta\nnnniddi.W5l

go to trial if the August 1, 1989, witness list were to stand
unmodified.

(Appendix 4, pp. 29-32.)

Before trial ended, the Landowners failed to offer any
further information regarding Dr. Shroder's possible testimony.
They did pot attempt to call Dr. Shroder as a witness either in
their case-in-chief or on rebuttal.

They made no proffer of his

proposed testimony.9
ARGUMENT
I.

A "POSSIBLE CONTEMPT" STANDARD DERIVED FROM DISCOVERY
RULES DOES NOT LIMIT TRIAL COURT DISCRETION IN MAKING
CASE MANAGEMENT DECISIONS.
Without citation to the Record, the Court of Appeals

denominates the proceedings resulting in the exclusion of
witnesses as a "discovery" matter controlled by Utah R.Civ.P. 26
and 37.

(Op. 6, 8.) 10 According to the Court of Appeals, these

discovery rules prohibit "the imposition of a sanction" without
an order that "'brings the offender squarely within possible

9

For instance, only after trial, at a hearing on a motion for
new trial, did the Landowners first contend that Dr. Shroder was a
"world-renowned geomorphologist." (Transcript of January 3, 1990,
hearing, excerpted in Appendix 7, p. 8; R. 1563).
Ostensibly
quoting D(r. Shroder, the Landowners also first disclosed after
trial a pprtion of his tentative opinions: "I warned him [sic]
years ago that that railroad could cause a landslide in that area.
In my article. And just whereas you've told me, Mr. Young, it
sounds lijce they certainly were a cause. I hate to tell you that
without more, so would you send me the information that you have."
(Appendix 7, p. 7.)
10

Later in its opinion, the Court of Appeals appears to
acknowledge this by recharacterizing the trial court's exclusion
decision as "a case management decision under the rules of civil
procedure" and the August 3, 1989 hearing as a "Pre-trial hearing."
(Op. 8, 9 and 11.)
-9g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

contempt of court.'"

(Op. 6-7 citing Sexton v. Sugar Creek

Packing Co., 38 Ohio App.2d 32, 311 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1973)
(emphasis added).

This holding is wrong.

As the hearing transcripts reveal, the trial court's
exclusion of witnesses was never a discovery issue.

Rather, at

all times the trial court acted under its inherent powers and
Utah R.Civ.P. 16 to manage properly the action before it in
preparation of trial.

Because the Court of Appeals erroneously

perceives the exclusion of Dr. Shroder as limited by the rules of
discovery, its abuse-of-discretion analysis is flawed.
A.

The Trial Court Excluded Witnesses as a Case

Management Decision.

Docket management was the trial court's

guiding concern as it addressed the Landowners' attempt to
continue trial again and the Railroad's requests to learn the
identity of witnesses:
You can't imagine what this would do to this court's
calendar to take two weeks now that I can't fill at
this late date . . . what you've done is to put at
least two weeks of the court's time that's going to be
lost or wasted not necessarily wasted, I can find
things to do. But it doesn't satisfy the public in
getting their cases heard and taken care o f . . . .
(Appendix 3, pp. 24-25.)
And I'm telling you, in my view, it's too late. And
that even though they give them an opportunity to
depose [Mr. Shroder] next week, then [the Railroad,]
they've got to get experts, they've got to get
somebody, if they want to counter it, so that you don't
have a reasonable opportunity to prepare your case,
either side. It seems to me that this is something
that ought to have been done a long time ago.
(Appendix 4, p. 16.).
-10-

At no time in any of the hearings or at trial was there
any mention of Utah R.Civ.P. 26 as the basis for excluding Dr.
Shroder.

Thus, the Court of Appeals' extensive references to

motions to compel/ contempt and Rule 26(f) (Op. 6-10) are
inapposite; the trial court was managing its docket as Rule 16
allows, not sanctioning discovery abuse.

(Appendix 4, pp. 22-

31.)
B»

Rule 16 Governs Case Management Decisions.

Trial

courts have broad powers, both inherent and under Utah R.Civ.P.
16(d), to manage their cases.

See Committee Note of 1983 to

Subdivision (f) of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;11 In re Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1441 (10th Cir. 1984)
(en banc) cert. denied, sub nom. Baker v. United States, 471 U.S.
1014 (1985); Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.
1985) ("T}ie sanctions contained in Rule 16(f) were designed to
punish lawyers and parties for conduct which unreasonably delays
or otherwise interferes with the expeditious management of trial
preparatipn").

Rule 16(d) incorporates by reference Rule

37(b)(2) only to identify some of the orders available to a trial
court; the standards by which those orders may issue in the
pretrial context are governed by the flexible language of Rule
16, not tjie more restrictive terms of the discovery rules
employed by the Court of Appeals.

11

Attached as Appendix 8. The sanctions sub-section of the
federal rule, which Utah Rule 16(d) tracks, is (f) rather than (d).
-11g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

Under Rule 16, "[n]either contumacious attitude nor
chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of
sanctions."

Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir.

1988) (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 16). As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit12 has held:
While on the whole Rule 16 is concerned with the
mechanics of pretrial scheduling and planning, its
spirit, intent and purposes is [sic] clearly designed
to be broadly remedial, allowing courts to actively
manage the preparation of cases for trial . . . We are
not dealing here with the historic concept of contempt.
We are not dealing with the traditional award of
attorney's fees as an adjunct of success in litigation.
Nor are we dealing with the defiant refusal of an
attorney or party to comply with some order of the
court, such as discovery. Instead, we are dealing with
a matter most critical to the court itself: management
of its docket and avoidance of unnecessary burdens on
the tax-supported courts, opposing parties or both.
In re Baker, 744 F.2d at 1440-41. Thus, the Court of Appeals
erred by adopting a "possible contempt" standard (Opinion, p. 6)
to govern trial court use of case management remedies—including
witness preclusion.
From this flawed premise the Court of Appeals
erroneously implies that, absent some type of formal written
order setting a deadline, the trial court has no power to exclude
witnesses.

(Op. 9.)

Yet, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee

has observed that "the violation of a court order" is necessary
only to impose a contempt sanction under Rule 16.

12

(Appendix 8.)

The Utah Supreme Court has previously sought guidance in
applying Rule 16 from decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit construing the corresponding federal
rule. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980).
-12~.\«~i\ iaA\nnnoiddi.W51

In any event, the Landowners have never claimed that the trial
court's June 27 directive did not require witness disclosure or
was somehow unenforceable.13
The Court of Appeals also mistakenly concluded that the
Landowners' counsel could rely on later dates referenced by the
Railroad for the disclosure of witnesses14 and, by so doing,
render the trial court's prior directive on disclosure a nullity.
(Op. 8.)

Even if the Railroad and Landowners had openly agreed

to an extension, such an agreement, absent embodiment in a fully
executed pretrial order, would have been ineffective.

See Hollis

v. United States, 744 F.2d 1430, 1432 (10th Cir. 1984) (in
considering sanctions for failure to meet court-ordered deadline,
an agreement between counsel to extend time for plaintiff to file
an amended complaint "was ineffective").15

13

The Landowner's brief to the Court of Appeals (they filed
no reply brief) entirely omits discussion of the trial court's June
27 pretrial hearing.
14

The Court of Appeals concludes as a central element of its
holding that the Landowners "relied upon [the] representations [in
the July 12, 1989, Letter] and would be prejudiced by their
withdrawal." (Op. 8.) This factual finding is unsupported. The
Landowners did not contend at the time the trial court was
considering the motion to strike that they "relied" on the contents
of the July 12, 1989 Letter in delaying their efforts to contact
Dr. Shroder and in failing to name witnesses by July 7, 1989.
(Appendix 4.) Such reliance was impossible to establish given that
the July 12 Letter dates five days after the trial court-imposed
deadline had passed. (Appendix 3, pp. 25-26.)
15

Moreover, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the July
12 Letter as a license to name unlimited numbers of new witnesses,
if accepted by the trial court at the time, would certainly have
required continuance of the trial in defiance of the trial court's
express refusal on June 27, 1989, to grant such a continuance.
-13g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

In summary, the trial court's instructions to counsel
and its delineation of the consequences for failure to heed those
instructions were unambiguous: failure to name witnesses would
result in exclusion.

(Appendix 3, pp. 28-29).

Later, when faced

with seventy-eight new witnesses (including Dr. Shroder) two
weeks before trial, the trial court acted within its discretion
in excluding witnesses not timely identified as the trial court's
"order" directed.

(Appendix 4, p. 23.)

See Bertram v. Harris,

423 P.2d 909, 916-18 (Alaska 1967) (no abuse of discretion under
Rule 16 to exclude late-named witness in violation of order
issued following pre-trial conference).

Cf.., Child v. Salt Lake

City, 575 P.2d 195, 197 (Utah 1978) (trial court's exercise of
discretion should be disturbed only if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable"). The Court of Appeals' decision,
which would fetter trial court discretion to cases of "possiblecontempt" in imposing case management sanctions, is simply wrong.
See Ikerd, 852 F.2d at 1258-59.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY PRESUMING PREJUDICE IN ANY
ERROR RESULTING FROM THE EXCLUSION OF DR. SHRODER,
ERRONEOUSLY RELIEVED THE LANDOWNERS OF THE BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING PREJUDICE.
Even if it could be said that the trial court abused

its discretion (and it did not), the Court of Appeals misstated
and misapplied the law of Utah regarding harmless error based on
dicta in Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Dav Saints HOSP*, 7 Utah 2d
39, 318 P.2d 330, 334 (1957).

See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. To the

extent the Court of Appeals relies upon Joseph to allocate to the
-14-

Railroad, the objecting party, the burden of establishing
prejudicial error, this Court should expressly disavow or reverse
that decision.

(Op. 11.)

The Court of Appeals correctly states the Rule 61
standard: "If a trial court erroneously excludes a witness, we
will reverse if the error was prejudicial to the substantial
rights of a party."

(Op. 4.)

Further, the Court of Appeals

agrees th^t the Landowners failed to make any proffer of Dr.
Shroder's testimony from which a determination of prejudice might
be made.

(Op. 9.)16 Problems with the Court of Appeals'

analysis £egin when the court concludes that the absence of a
proffer is no problem because the exclusion of Dr. Shroder was
not an "evidentiary ruling" and "[t]he failure to proffer . . .
does not preclude an appeal of a case management decision."
9.)17

(Op.

As a consequence, the court reasons, one need only look

to the Railroad's objection to Dr. Shroder's testimony for
16

Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals acknowledges that the
Landowner? made no proffer of Dr. Shroder's testimony (Op. 9), it
is puzzling to read subsequently: "Dr. Shroder's testimony . . .
would have indicated that the slide was caused by defendant's cuts
at the toe of the slide. . . ." (Op. 11.) Nothing in the Record
supports this characterization of what Dr. Shroder might have said.
17

The Court of Appeals also places great emphasis on the
Railroad'p supposed knowledge of Dr. Shroder's "geomorphological
credentials," implying that the Railroad was somehow acquainted
with what this witness might say.
(Op. 11.)
While it is
undisputed that all parties knew of Dr. Shroder's early writings
from almost the inception of the action, there was no mention of
his "geomorphological credentials" (a characterization unverified
to this day) until the hearing on the post-trial motion for new
trial in January 3, 1990. (Appendix 7, p. 7.) In fact, neither
the word "geomorphologist" nor its equivalent is to be found in any
of the pretrial transcripts.
-15g:\wpl\188\00001ddl.W51

"[s]ome indication of the importance of the error . . . ."
11 citing Joseph, supra.)

(Op.

Finding in this objection a reason to

"doubt" the absence of prejudice, the Court of Appeals resolves
that "doubt" in favor of the Landowners and finds that the
exclusion of Dr. Shroder's testimony "was prejudicial."

Id.

This goes too far.
The Court of Appeals disregards Rule 61 and its
application as embodied in the procedures of Utah R.Evid.
103(a)(2).

The latter states: "Error may not be predicated upon

a ruling which . . . excludes evidence unless a substantial right
of the party is affected, and . . . the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer. . . . •• Utah R.Evid.
103(a)(2).

This provision is comprehensive; it applies to all

rulings wjiich exclude evidence, without distinction between
rulings premised on other rules of evidence and those premised on
disregard for the court's pretrial directives.

Utah R.Evid.

103(a).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit iji United States ex rel. Leonard Tire Co. v. Ravco, Inc.,
616 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1980) (excluding documentary evidence),
addressed this issue in an analogous context, remarking that;
[T]he trial court could not have determined that any
injustice would result, because [the defendant] did not
tender the document, make an offer of proof, or provide
the court with any indication of the document's
importance. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). Further, since
it is not part of the record, we also are unable to
determine that the contents of the exhibit were so
central to [the defendant's] case that its exclusion
prevented examination of the real issues. . . . The
-16<**\mi\ iaa\ooooiddi.W5l

court's specific warning that dire consequences would
follow the failure to submit an exhibit list makes us
unsympathetic to [the defendant's] belated claim that
its most critical piece of evidence was mistakenly
overlooked during trial preparation.
616 F.2d at 464. This is consistent with Utah decisions
involving the essential nature of a proffer under Rule 103(a)(2)
and its predecessor, Rule 5.

See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498,

499-500 (Utah 1986); Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240,
1243 (Utaji 1980); Downey State Bank v. Malor-Blakenev Corp., 578
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978).
The proffer has as its purpose to inform the appeals
court sufficiently to make a determination whether, had the
evidence peen admitted, "there is any reasonable likelihood that
there would have been a different result at the trial."
Bradford, 621 P.2d at 1243. There is no suggestion in the cases
that the Rule 103 phrase "a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence" is so limited as not to include an exclusionary ruling
based on non-disclosure of witnesses.
The Court of Appeals' decision, which relies only on
dicta frojn the 1957 Joseph case (Op. 10-11), is counterintuitive
both as a fact conclusion and a procedural guide.

The Railroad

objected, not just to the testimony of Dr. Shroder, but to the
testimony of all seventy-eight new witnesses.

(Appendix 5.)

Thus, there is no basis for the Court of Appeals' presumption
that the Railroad's blanket objection transformed Dr. Shroder's
undisclosed (and, to this day, universally unknown) proposed

-17g:\wpl\l88\00001ddl.W51

testimony into evidence that could materially affect the result
at trial.
In broader application, the Court of Appeals' rule
results i:p. an absurdity.

Under Rule 103(a)(1), the Railroad must

object in order to preserve its rights and take an appeal.

Yet,

if the Railroad objects, the Court of Appeals now deems the
objection an admission that the evidence could substantially
effect the result at trial.

(Op. 10-11.)

"Doubt" as to the

effect of the excluded evidence must now be resolved in favor of
the proponent of the evidence.

(Op. 11-12.)

Therefore, to

preserve its right of appeal, the Railroad is now required to
take action that will ultimately render any error prejudicial and
reversible.

The only conceivable way for any objecting party to

avoid this result would be to take a deposition and make its own
proffer of the evidence it seeks to exclude.

The rules do not

mandate or intend such absurd results.
The straightforward allocation of burden and
responsibility outlined in Rule 103 is intended to avoid such
dilemmas.

The party resisting the offer of evidence has the

burden, ijx the first instance under sub-section (a)(1), to object
for the record.

If the objection is sustained, then under sub-

section (£)(2) the offering party must make an offer of proof for
the record.

Neither party is presumed by its actions to have

affirmed the position of the other or is called upon to preserve
the evidejice for another.

Only in this fashion is the appellate

court left with an adequate record to consider on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Supreme Court should review
these two important questions.
DATED this 4th day of May, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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